FC/0/0/8/0/9200000000950800.jpg' alt='Arms And Influence Pdf' title='Arms And Influence Pdf' />Original Signature of Member 115TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION H. R. ll To provide congressional review and to counter aggression by the Governments of Iran, the Russian. Many of the richest citizens are reshaping public policy, and society, as they see fit. Because of their numbers, they have more influence than the. The end game of Chinas arms export strategy. Authors Ron Matthews, Defence Academy of the UK, and Xiaojuan Ping, NUSIs Chinas arms export strategy really a success story The first question is to establish whether there has been dramatic growth in Chinas arms exports, emulating the success of its broader commercial exports. While the picture is not equivocal, there are signs that something is indeed happening. Chinese arms sales are growing. Across 2. 01. 21. In fact, over 2. 01. Chinas arms exports raced ahead of those from Germany, France and the United Kingdom, making China the worlds third biggest arms exporter. This is not a short term aberration, but a long term trend. Between 2. 00. 0 and 2. Chinese arms exports expanded by a factor of 6. In 2. 01. 6, China shipped US2. Frances US2. 2 billion, but well ahead of the United Kingdoms US1. While Chinas 2. 01. United States at 3. Russia 2. 3 per cent, and has disappeared altogether with France 6 per cent, Germany 5. United Kingdom 4. Chinas arms exports have been criticised for lacking global appeal since 7. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Yet, this criticism is unfair. Such dependence on a few core customers affects both mature and new entrant arms exporters alike. Flower Shops In Sierra Vista. Russia was the worlds second biggest arms exporter across 2. India, Vietnam, China and Algeria for 7. Likewise, 7. 1 per cent of UK arms exports go to India, the United States and Saudi Arabia which alone accounted for half of all UK sales across 2. Detractors argue that Chinas weapons are only attractive to poorer nations because its older weapons are cheaper. While there is some truth in this argument, it needs qualification. China has been successful in diversifying its customer base and now exports arms to 5. Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Many of Chinas clients are indeed developing countries. For example, two thirds of the countries situated in the worlds poorest continent, Africa, procure weapon systems from China, and much of it is basic military equipment. But times are changing. Chinese arms are no longer relics from a bygone Soviet era. The PLA has been replacing old Soviet platforms with improved indigenous models and is now exporting modernised platforms, including Type 9. Max Steel Filmes Download Gratis. MBTs, J 1. 0 fighters and Yuan class submarines to Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan. China has also adapted, innovated and engaged in systems integration in a determined bid to move up the technology ladder, developing, for instance, credible and competitive unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs and anti ship cruise missiles. Raised technological sophistication combined with relatively low procurement cost has led to increasingly cost effective arms exports. Their attractiveness to more discerning buyers has been translated into a sales portfolio in which 2. Chinas customers are now positioned in the upper middlehigher income country categories, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Is there something different, something special, that distinguishes Chinas arms export strategy from its Western counterpartsThe answer is a resounding yes. First and foremost, Western strategists should not be under any illusion that export revenue is the primary goal. Rather, Beijings end game is longer term geo political and strategic influence. The search for regional and global influence is the critical aim of Chinese economic diplomacy. It reflects a more narrowly focused aspect of Beijings soft power framework, embracing foreign aid, foreign direct investment, overseas educational programs and, importantly, arms sales. Chinas arms export model operates according to a carefully crafted strategy based on three principles promoting the legitimate self defence capability of the recipient country strengthening the peace, security and stability of that country and region and non interference in its internal affairs. Beijings long standing approach of linking non interference to arms sales rests on the view that a customers political, military and human rights record lies outside the contractual arrangements. The no questions asked policy attracts the opprobrium of Western states, but there is no disputing its effectiveness in selling guns and securing influence. The policy particularly appeals to second and third tier military states suffering excessive dependence on US or Russian weaponry. Chinese arms offer poorer states the opportunity to diversify arms sources, regain a degree of sovereignty over military capability and reduce strategic vulnerability to arms embargoes. How To Edit Gwbasic Program. The Chinese arms export model has several other significant features. From a Chinese strategic perspective, it leverages strong client state relationships and in the process bolsters Beijings influence, particularly among neighbouring states. It is no accident that Chinas arms sales to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar indirectly act to contain the potential threat of Asias other mega power, India. Chinese arms are also competitively packaged. Pricing is low compared to Western models. Chinese drones, for example, reportedly cost 1. US version. Finally, China is amenable to technology transfer through defence offset, supporting client states to indigenise maintenance, repair and overhaul activities and even produce components. While it may not yet be the dominant player, Chinas arms export strategy has proved effective in taking market share from competitor nations. China has also begun to encroach into higher income markets, especially where technological sophistication is not required. There is a long term strategy at work here, driven by diplomatic and geostrategic objectives, not commercial gain. Ron Matthews is Chair of Defence Economics at the Centre for Defence Management and Leadership, Cranfield University and the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. Xiaojuan Ping is a researcher at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.